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Abstract  
 
A levy on the Clean Development Mechanism and other carbon trading schemes is a 
potential source of finance for climate change adaptation. An adaptation levy of 2 
percent is currently imposed on all CDM transactions which could raise around $500 
million between now and 2012.  This paper analyses the scope for raising further 
adaptation finance from the CDM, the economic costs (deadweight loss) of such a 
measure and the incidence of the levy, that is, the economic burden the levy would 
impose on the buyers and sellers of credits.  We find that a levy of 2 percent could 
raise up to $2 billion a year in 2020 if there are no restrictions on demand. This could 
rise to $10 billion for a 10 percent tax.   Restrictions on credit demand (called 
supplementarity limits, the requirement that most emission abatement should happen 
domestically) curtail trade volumes and consequently tax revenues. They also alter the 
economic impact of the CDM levy. Without supplementarity restrictions sellers 
(developing countries) bear two-thirds of the cost of the tax. If there are 
supplementarity limits they can pass on the tax burden to buyers (developed 
countries) more or less in full. Without supplementarity restrictions the distortionary 
effect of the levy (its deadweight loss) rises sharply with the tax rate. With them the 
deadweight loss is close to zero. 
 
 
Keywords: Clean Development Mechanism, adaptation, CDM levy, adaptation finance 
 
 
                                                 
*
 This paper was commissioned as background material for the 2010 World Development Report of the 
World Bank. We are grateful to the World Bank for their support and to Rhona Barr, Alex Bowen, 
Simon Dietz, Kirk Hamilton, Charlene Watson and Dimitri Zenghelis for their insightful comments. 
The views expressed in this paper are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the 
World Bank or the organisations they are affiliated with. 
 4 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Raising sufficient funding for adaptation measures in developing countries is a key 
challenge for the post-2012 climate change architecture. How much adaptation in 
developing countries will cost is still highly uncertain, but available estimates point to 
financing needs of tens of billions of dollars by 2020: The lowest estimates start at $4 
– 9 billion a year, the highest ones are in excess of $100 billion (see Agrawala and 
Fankhauser 2008, Fankhauser 2009 and Parry et al 2009 for recent surveys).  
 
Currently there are two main sources of international adaptation finance. The first 
source is bilateral and multilateral initiatives such as the Pilot Programme on Climate 
Resilience, the Least-Developed Country Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund. 
They are financed through fiscal transfers from western governments, not dissimilar 
to the way multilateral development assistance is pledged.  
 
The second source is the Adaptation Fund of the UNFCCC, which is funded through a 
2 percent levy on all transactions under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
On current trends, the levy can be expected to yield perhaps $500 million by 2012 – 
substantial but nowhere near enough to meet global adaptation needs.1 
 
Other funding mechanisms – such as a tax on international bunker fuels, a global 
carbon tax or the sale of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) – have therefore been put 
forward. They have been surveyed and assessed by Müller (2008) and Harmeling et al 
(2009).  
 
No consensus on the best sources of adaptation finance emerges from these studies, 
but an extended levy on carbon credit transactions tends to score fairly highly in 
assessment exercises. The CDM levy has the advantage over new proposals of being 
up and running and, unlike government pledges, it creates a revenue stream that is 
clearly distinct from and additional to official development assistance. 
 
But how much money can realistically be raised through a levy on the CDM or its 
successor mechanism? The tax base is relatively small, even if trading volumes 
continue to grow and the levy were broadened to include other carbon transactions, 
such as Joint Implementation and the trade in AAUs. This means the tax rate would 
have to be higher than the current 2 percent. But like all taxes, the CDM levy imposes 
a cost (deadweight loss) on the economy in the form of less abatement or the same 
abatement at higher costs. The deadweight loss increases disproportionately with tax 
rate, suggesting there are in-built limits to the amount of money the CDM levy may 
raise.  
 
Moreover, it seems counterintuitive to raise revenues from an activity – emission 
reductions – that ought to be encouraged and not stifled through taxation. Complaints 
about the adaptation levy do not feature much in the extensive literature on CDM 
shortcomings and transaction costs (see e.g., Hoogzaad et al 2008; IETA 2008; Streck 
                                                 
1
 The CDM is expected to deliver emission reductions of about 1.3 billion tonnes by 2012 
(www.cdmpipeline.org; as of May 2009). At a carbon price of $20 (higher than the current market rate) 
the 2 percent levy would yield revenues of $20*1,300*2% ~ $500 million. 
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and Lin 2008; Wara 2007). But how much of a burden does the adaptation levy 
actually impose on the global carbon market? 
 
One may also question whether the CDM levy indeed raises additional adaptation 
funding from developed countries, as expected under the post 2012 climate 
architecture. Developing countries have always seen the CDM levy as a solidarity 
payment from countries like China and India, which host the majority of CDM 
projects, to least developed countries. They are at least partially right. As with all 
taxes, the economic burden of the CDM levy is shared between the buyers and sellers 
of CDM credits, that is, between developed and developing countries.  Who pays how 
much is an empirical question and depends on the relative price elasticity of supply 
and demand.  
 
This paper explores these basic insights from tax theory numerically. We start with a 
description of the analytical approach and the data sources model on which the 
numerical results are based (section 2). Focusing on the year 2020, we then estimate 
the revenue raising potential of a tax on international carbon transactions (section 3), 
assess the distortionary effects of such a tax (section 4) and analyse the tax incidence, 
that is the split of the tax burden between supply and demand (section 5).  
 
In each case, we ask how the outcome depends on the design of the international 
climate regime, in particular the presence of import quotas on CDM credits. The 
Kyoto Protocol implicitly restricts the use of international offsets by requiring that 
most of the abatement action occurs domestically. These supplementarity restrictions 
are known to be welfare-reducing because they limit the benefits from trade, although 
they help to accelerate the long-term decarbonisation of the domestic economy 
(Fankhauser and Hepburn 2009). As we shall see, supplementarity limits also have 
strong ramifications for the economic impact of the CDM levy. 
 
2. Method and data 
 
The analysis is based on a straightforward static model of global supply and demand 
for CDM-style offset credits. Aggregate supply and demand curves were calculated 
from a series of marginal abatement cost curves (MACs) for different countries and 
sectors. The levy was then imposed by adjusting the supply schedule for the tax rate, 
assuming a fully competitive market and no general equilibrium effects.  
 
Chart 1 shows the analysis in stylised fashion. D denotes the global demand for 
credits. S1 shows the global supply without a levy and S2 with a levy.  The total 
amount of revenue raised is shown by the square ABGF. Of this total, a share of 
ABDC (lightly shaded) falls on the demand side, and CDGF (heavily shaded) falls on 
the supply side. The deadweight loss of the levy is the triangle BEG. 
 
The data to calculate global MACs were taken from the Global Carbon Finance 
(GLOCAF) model and the data sources used to calibrate that model.  GLOCAF 
distinguishes 15 world regions and 17 sectors, using data from several models: 
POLES for energy emissions (e.g., European Commission 1996), IIASA for forestry 
emissions (e.g., Benitez-Ponce et al. 2007) and IMAGE for non-CO2 emissions (e.g., 
Bouwman et al. 2006).  
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Chart 1: Stylised analysis 
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While these are well respected models in their respective fields there is still 
considerable uncertainty about the costs of abatement in different regions.  Indeed, 
these MAC curves are influenced by policy, so for example heavy investment in 
renewable technology in Annex 1 regions would reduce the demand for credits from 
Annex 1 regions. To account for this uncertainty we distinguished between several 
supply and demand scenarios.  
 
On the supply side the main uncertainty is about the eligibility of different abatement 
technologies. The MAC curves were recalibrated to take into account the fact that not 
all of the potential abatement may be accessed through the CDM. The following two 
scenarios were investigated: 
 
• Low Supply – The CDM operates in 2020 in the same way as now, with certain 
sectors and regions generating very few credits. 
•  High Supply –  The CDM is gradually improved and expanded such that more 
credits are generated from sectors and regions which currently produce little, 
including emissions reductions from deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD).   
The two credit supply curves generated from the data are shown in Chart 2. An 
important assumption in the high supply scenario is the inclusion of the complex and 
controversial REDD sector (see e.g. Eliasch 2008). To identify and isolate the impact 
of REDD we also calculated a medium supply scenario, which excludes REDD but 
maintains the same assumptions as the high scenario in all other respects (see Annex 
for full results).  
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Chart 2: Supply scenarios 
 
 
The demand for CDM credits depends on MAC data, business as usual emissions, but 
also on the global abatement target. We assumed that all Annex 1 regions would cut 
their emissions by 20 percent, relative to 1990, by 2020. This is at the lower end of 
the range identified in the IPCC fourth assessment report (Barker et al. 2007) but 
higher than what many countries are currently committed to. Non-Annex 1 regions do 
not take on any targets.  Both assumptions are of course contingent on the shape of 
any global deal and different targets would change the results.  However, qualitatively 
the story should not change much. 
 
A far more critical assumption concerns possible restrictions in global credit demand 
due to supplementarity rules. The Kyoto Protocol (and many countries in their 
domestic arrangements) emphasises the priority of domestic abatement over trading.  
Without such supplementarity limits the demand for CDM credits would be relatively 
elastic. But once they are introduced, demand becomes highly inelastic at the point the 
constraint starts to bind. This has powerful ramifications for the distortionary effect of 
the levy and the tax incidence, which both depend heavily on the price elasticity of 
demand. We therefore distinguish the following demand scenarios: 
 
• High demand – No supplementarity restrictions and completely free trading of 
emissions credits 
• Low demand – Demand is restricted. Regions may only buy in up to 20 
percent of their target through the use of credits 
 
The two demand schedules generated by the data are depicted in Chart 3. Finally, the 
analysis distinguished two levy rates: The 2 percent tax rate currently in place and a 
higher 10 percent levy with the potential of raising higher tax revenues.  
 
Chart 3: Demand scenarios 
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3. Potential revenues from the levy 
 
The first question we turn to is the potential of the CDM levy to raise revenue. The 
main parameters that determine the revenue potential of the levy, besides the tax rate, 
are the volume of CDM transactions and the price of credits. Table 1 summarises the 
pre-tax value of the two parameters for the different scenarios. It also gives the 
revenues we can expect for the two tax rates considered. 
 
At the current tax rate of 2 percent the CDM levy is unlikely to raise more than $2 
billion a year by 2020, or as little as $250 million if a low demand is combined with a 
glut in supply. Raising $10 billion a year would require a tax rate of at least 10 
percent and the absence of any constraints on demand.  
 
Table 1: Revenue potential of a CDM levy (by 2020) 
Demand 
Supply 
High Low 
High Pre-tax price ($/t)  41.5  
Pre-tax volume (Gt)   2.5  
Tax revenue, 2% ($bn)   2.0 
Tax revenue, 10% ($bn)  10.1  
Pre-tax price ($/t): 11.2  
Pre-tax volume (Gt):   1.3  
Tax revenue, 2% ($bn)  0.25 
Tax revenue, 10% ($bn)   1.4 
Low Pre-tax price ($/t): 64.8  
Pre-tax volume (Gt):   1.6  
Tax revenue, 2% ($bn)   2.0 
Tax revenue, 10% ($bn)   9.7  
Pre-tax price ($/t): 40.3  
Pre-tax volume (Gt):   1.2  
Tax revenue, 2% ($bn)   1.0 
Tax revenue, 10% ($bn)   4.9 
 
 
Revenues are fairly insensitive to the assumed credit supply, particularly in the high 
demand scenario. The higher transaction volumes that a stronger supply pipeline 
would bring are offset by the fall in carbon prices. For the same reason, the inclusion 
or exclusion of REDD has little impact in the high demand case. Excluding REDD 
from an extended CDM reduces transaction volumes by about 20 percent. However, 
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the carbon price would rise by a similar percentage and tax revenues would remain 
steady at around $10 billion a year (see Annex).  
 
Revenue expectations are much more sensitive to changes on the demand side. 
Constraining demand through supplementarity limits has an immediate and strong 
impact on both transaction volumes and the carbon price, which drop by 20–50 
percent and 25 – 40 percent, respectively. As a consequence tax revenues fall by 
about half in the low supply case and by over 80 per cent in the high supply case. 
Restricting demand is bad news for the revenue prospects of the CDM levy. 
 
4. The distortionary effects of the levy 
 
Practically all taxes impose a cost on the economy, the deadweight loss that arises 
from moving the economy away from its equilibrium (see Chart 1 above). The ideal 
tax from an efficiency point of view raises whatever amount of revenue is required 
with minimal distortions to the economy. In the words of Colbert, the 17th century 
French finance minister, the goose has to be plucked in a way that yields the largest 
amount of feathers with the least amount of hissing. 
 
To reduce their distortionary effect, economists prefer taxes that are broad-based (for 
example a tax on consumption) or target activities that are inelastic to changes in price 
(such as the consumption of alcohol and tobacco). A broad-based tax is preferred 
because it reduces arbitrage and substitution opportunities and because it requires a 
lower tax rate to raise a given amount of revenue. The deadweight loss of a tax rises at 
the square of the tax rate,2 so there is a premium to keeping the tax rate low. Activities 
with inelastic demand are attractive because the tax will cause only a small deviation 
in the quantities consumed. 
 
The deadweight loss from a tax may be turned into a gain if taxation leads to a 
socially desirable deviation from the market equilibrium. This is the case for 
Pigouvian taxes, such as pollution levies or a carbon tax, which correct for market 
externalities. The motive for taxation is then not just revenue generation but the 
correction of market failures. 
 
Clearly, a levy on greenhouse gas emission reductions does not fall into this category. 
It discourages an activity that should, if anything, be promoted. The tax base – the 
volume of CDM transactions – is also still fairly narrow. So how damaging is the 
adaptation levy to the development of the global carbon market? 
 
The answer depends on the tax rate and on the shape of the demand function (see 
Table 2). In the absence of supplementarity limits (high demand case), the demand for 
international carbon credits is relatively elastic, a reflection of the flat MAC curve in 
the Annex 1 buyer countries. This suggests that the distortionary effect of the CDM 
levy might be substantial, and indeed in the 10 percent-tax case the deadweight loss is 
equivalent to about 1-2 percent of the revenue raised. However, in absolute terms the 
amount is small and it is a tiny fraction of the overall gains from trade. In the case of a 
2 percent levy the deadweight loss is less than one percent of total tax revenues.  
                                                 
2
 Assuming supply and demand are roughly linear at the market equilibrium. See Stern (1987) for an 
introduction to optimal taxation. 
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Table 2: Deadweight loss from the CDM levy (in percent of tax revenues)  
Demand 
Supply 
High Low 
High 2%  levy  0.35  
10%  levy  1.25  
2%  levy    0.00  
10%  levy    0.00 
Low 2%  levy  0.60  
10%  levy  2.19 
2%  levy    0.10 
10%  levy    0.40 
 
In the presence of supplementarity limits (low demand case), the demand curve is 
close to vertical and the levy causes no additional distortions even in the 10 percent 
tax case. The deadweight loss is essentially zero. However, we need to remember that 
the supplementarity limit itself is a highly distortionary constraint on trade with huge 
welfare implications. The effect of the CDM levy is of second order in comparison.  
 
The inelastic demand schedule also results in a larger price effect. In the low demand 
case the levy leads to an increase in the carbon price of up to 10 percent. The tax is 
fully passed on. In the high demand case, where the demand response curtails the 
price effect, prices rise by only 3 percent.  
 
5. Tax incidence 
 
A key tenet of tax theory is that, whether a tax is raised on supply or demand, the tax 
burden is shared between buyers and sellers. Who pays how much depends on the 
relative price elasticity of supply and demand. The more price-inelastic party will bear 
a higher share of the cost. 
 
The difference between the high demand case (where the price response is relatively 
elastic) and the low demand case (where the price response is highly inelastic because 
of supplementarity limits) is therefore crucial in determining the tax incidence of the 
CDM levy.  Table 3 shows the results. 
 
Table 3: Tax incidence (cost borne by buyer / seller in percent of total) 
Demand 
Supply 
High Low 
High 2% tax, buyer      37.5  
2% tax, seller    62.5  
10% tax, buyer      31.7  
10% tax, seller    68.3  
2% tax, buyer    100.0  
2% tax, seller     0.0  
10% tax, buyer    100.0  
10% tax, seller     0.0 
Low 2% tax, buyer      30.7  
2% tax, seller    69.3  
10% tax, buyer      26.2  
10% tax, seller    73.8 
2% tax, buyer      75.0  
2% tax, seller    25.0  
10% tax, buyer      82.5  
10% tax, seller    17.5 
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In the high demand case, when there are no supplementarity constraints, the cost of 
the levy is predominantly borne by the sellers of credits, that is, by developing 
countries. In pretty much all cases they will foot over two-thirds of the total tax bill. 
The CDM levy becomes a South-South transfer, as southern negotiators have long 
claimed, rather than a transfer from developed countries to developing countries. 
 
This changes completely in the low demand case. The restrictions on credit demand 
allow sellers to pass on the full extent of the tax to buyers without encountering an 
adverse demand response. The tax burden is borne practically fully by the developed 
country buyers of CDM credits. But developing countries also lose out because the 
demand limits prevent them from selling more credits at a higher price.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Besides fiscal transfer from governments, the 2 percent adaptation levy on CDM 
transactions is the main source of international adaptation funding at the moment. The 
amounts currently raised are clearly insufficient, but an extended levy on a broader set 
of carbon market transactions remains an attractive option to raise adaptation revenues 
going forward – or indeed to finance other climate change needs, such as technology 
support. 
 
In this paper we have explored three basic economic features of an extended CDM 
levy: 
 
- Revenue potential: how much revenue can realistically be raised through a 
levy on carbon transactions? 
- Distortionary effects: what is the deadweight loss of such a levy and what is its 
effect on the development of the international carbon market? 
- Tax incidence: how is the tax burden shared between the buyers and sellers of 
credit, that is, between developed and developing countries? 
 
We concluded that a levy on CDM transactions (or its successor mechanism) alone is 
unlikely to raise the amount of finance needed for adaptation over the medium term. 
By 2020, the levy could raise around $2 billion a year with a 2 percent tax rate and up 
to $10 billion a year with a 10 percent tax rate. These are substantial sums, but to meet 
global adaptation needs they would have to be complemented with revenues from 
other sources (e.g., government pledges, a tax on bunker fuels or the auctioning of 
AAUs). 
 
Moreover, revenues of this order are only realistic if there are no restrictions on the 
demand for credit. This is unlikely. The principle of supplementarity – the view that 
domestic abatement should have precedence over international trade – is strongly held 
both in the international arena and in the domestic policy approach of most Annex 1 
countries.  Although such limits to “where” flexibility are known to increase 
compliance costs, it is fairly certain that most of the cap-and-trade schemes currently 
contemplated in Annex 1 countries will have limits on the use of international offsets, 
as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme already has.  
 
This will have a detrimental effect on the revenue raising potential of a CDM levy. In 
the presence of supplementarity restrictions tax revenues would fall to around $1 
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billion in the 2% case, or to as little as $250 million if restricted demand coincides 
with a glut in supply. Even with a 10% tax, revenues would be less than $5 billion. 
 
On the positive side, supplementarity limits help to reduce the distortionary effect the 
levy has on the carbon market by making the demand response less elastic (although 
that also reduces the gains from trade, Fankhauser and Hepburn 2009; Edmonds et al 
2008). Even without constraints on demand, the deadweight loss from the levy is 
fairly small. However, it rises disproportionally as the tax rate rises, putting a de facto 
limit on the revenue potential of the tax.  
 
With free trading of credits, the credit price is not very sensitive to a levy.  With 
supplementarity restrictions, credit suppliers can pass on the levy to buyers and so the 
credit price is very sensitive to the levy. 
 
The ability to pass on the tax determines the allocation of the tax burden between 
buyers and sellers. In a world of tight restrictions, the tax is passed on and the 
incidence of the levy mainly falls on the buyers of credits. The revenue raised could 
be rightfully seen as additional adaptation finance provided by developed countries.  
 
But in a world with no restrictions on the use of credits, the incidence of a levy is 
mostly borne by the suppliers of emissions credits, that is developing countries. They 
could foot over two-thirds of the total tax bill. The CDM levy becomes a South-South 
transfer from CDM host countries like China and India to highly vulnerable countries 
elsewhere in the developing world. This is another reason why the revenues from the 
levy will have to be complemented by additional adaptation funding, this time from 
developed countries. 
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Annex: Full set of results 
 
 
1.  High Supply – High Demand 
 
Improved CDM and credits from REDD. No supplementarity restrictions on demand. 
 
Table A1: 2 percent Tax Rate 
$0.8 tax Without Tax With Tax Change
Credit Price $/tCO2 41.5 41.8 1%
Quantity of CDM Credits Sold (Mt) 2517 2503 -1%
Government Tax Revenue ($M) 0 2002.5
Change in Demander Surplus ($M) 0 753.1
Change in Supplier Surplus $M 0 1257
Deadweight Loss $M 0 7
 
 
Table A2: 10 percent  Tax Rate 
$4.1 tax Without Tax With Tax Change
Credit Price $/tCO2 41.5 42.8 3%
Quantity of CDM Credits Sold (Mt) 2517 2456 -2%
Government Tax Revenue ($M) 0 10068.5
Change in Demander Surplus ($M) 0 3232.5
Change in Supplier Surplus $M 0 6962
Deadweight Loss $M 0 126
 
 
 
2.  High Supply – Low Demand 
 
Improved CDM and credits from REDD. Supplementarity restrictions on demand. 
 
Table A3:  2 percent Tax Rate 
$0.2 tax Without Tax With Tax Change
Credit Price $/tCO2 11.2 11.4 2%
Quantity of CDM Credits Sold (Mt) 1252 1252 0%
Government Tax Revenue ($M) 0 250.4
Change in Demander Surplus ($M) 0 250.4
Change in Supplier Surplus $M 0 0
Deadweight Loss $M 0 0
 
 
Table A4:  10 percent Tax Rate 
$1.1 tax Without Tax With Tax Change
Credit Price $/tCO2 11.2 12.3 10%
Quantity of CDM Credits Sold (Mt) 1252 1252 0%
Government Tax Revenue ($M) 0 1377.3
Change in Demander Surplus ($M) 0 1377.3
Change in Supplier Surplus $M 0 0
Deadweight Loss $M 0 0
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3.  Medium Supply – High Demand 
 
Improved CDM but no credits from REDD. No supplementarity restrictions. 
 
Table A5:  2 percent Tax Rate 
$1 tax Without Tax With Tax Change
Credit Price $/tCO2 52.4 52.7 1%
Quantity of CDM Credits Sold (Mt) 2038 2027 -1%
Government Tax Revenue ($M) 0 2026.6
Change in Demander Surplus ($M) 0 609.7
Change in Supplier Surplus $M 0 1424
Deadweight Loss $M 0 7
 
 
Table A6: 10 percent Tax Rate 
$5.2 tax Without Tax With Tax Change
Credit Price $/tCO2 52.4 53.9 3%
Quantity of CDM Credits Sold (Mt) 2038 1981 -3%
Government Tax Revenue ($M) 0 10298.9
Change in Demander Surplus ($M) 0 3014.0
Change in Supplier Surplus $M 0 7435
Deadweight Loss $M 0 150
 
 
4.  Medium Supply – Low Demand 
 
Improved CDM but no credits from REDD. Supplementarity restrictions on demand. 
 
Table A7: 2 percent Tax Rate 
$0.4 tax Without Tax With Tax Change
Credit Price $/tCO2 21.8 22.2 2%
Quantity of CDM Credits Sold (Mt) 1252 1252 0%
Government Tax Revenue ($M) 0 500.8
Change in Demander Surplus ($M) 0 500.8
Change in Supplier Surplus $M 0 0
Deadweight Loss $M 0 0
 
 
Table A8: 10 percent Tax Rate 
$2.2 tax Without Tax With Tax Change
Credit Price $/tCO2 21.8 24 10%
Quantity of CDM Credits Sold (Mt) 1252 1252 0%
Government Tax Revenue ($M) 0 2754.6
Change in Demander Surplus ($M) 0 2754.6
Change in Supplier Surplus $M 0 0
Deadweight Loss $M 0 0
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5.  Low Supply – High Demand 
 
No changes to the CDM from today. No supplementarity restrictions on demand. 
 
Table A9: 2 percent Tax Rate 
$1.3 tax Without Tax With Tax Change
Credit Price $/tCO2 64.8 65.2 1%
Quantity of CDM Credits Sold (Mt) 1560 1545 -1%
Government Tax Revenue ($M) 0 2008.1
Change in Demander Surplus ($M) 0 621.0
Change in Supplier Surplus $M 0 1399
Deadweight Loss $M 0 12
 
 
Table A10:  10 percent Tax Rate 
$6.5 tax Without Tax With Tax Change
Credit Price $/tCO2 64.8 66.5 3%
Quantity of CDM Credits Sold (Mt) 1560 1495 -4%
Government Tax Revenue ($M) 0 9714.7
Change in Demander Surplus ($M) 0 2596.5
Change in Supplier Surplus $M 0 7331
Deadweight Loss $M 0 213
 
 
 
6.  Low Supply – Low Demand 
 
No changes to the CDM from today. Supplementarity restrictions on demand. 
 
Table A11:  2 percent Tax Rate 
$0.8 tax Without Tax With Tax Change
Credit Price $/tCO2 40.3 40.9 1%
Quantity of CDM Credits Sold (Mt) 1246 1245 0%
Government Tax Revenue ($M) 0 995.6
Change in Demander Surplus ($M) 0 747.3
Change in Supplier Surplus $M 0 249
Deadweight Loss $M 0 1
 
 
Table A12:  10 percent Tax Rate 
$4 tax Without Tax With Tax Change
Credit Price $/tCO2 40.3 43.6 8%
Quantity of CDM Credits Sold (Mt) 1246 1236 -1%
Government Tax Revenue ($M) 0 4945.7
Change in Demander Surplus ($M) 0 4096.6
Change in Supplier Surplus $M 0 869
Deadweight Loss $M 0 20
 
 
 
